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What Bill Slim Did Next: The Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College 
Dr Andrew Stewart* 
 
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the reopening of the Imperial Defence College (IDC), today 
the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS). The recognition of this, and the 90th anniversary of 
the college’s establishment that will follow next year, comes at a period when the discussion that 
was central to the first post-war course in April 1946 has never been more acute. After the end of 
the Second World War there were great doubts about what the future held for Britain. The wartime 
Lend-Lease deal (signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt on 11 March 1941), had allow 
the US to transfer arms and military equipment to Britain without payment. This was cancelled in 
September 1945 and more than $4 billion of loans and credit was needed from the US and Canada 
to fill the wartime gap in Britain’s parlous finances. Even with this the country's national debt 
would soon stand at about 250 per cent of GDP and, despite its only recent military triumph, its 
global position appeared much weakened.1 As one of the leading historians of the period has 
argued, nonetheless there was a bullish outlook and across ‘the whole spectrum of party opinion, 
British leaders had no doubt that Britain must uphold its status as the third great power’.2 At the 
same time as building on the links that had now been forged with the US, it was believed that this 
could best be achieved through reinforcing the traditional relationship with what was now termed as 
the British Commonwealth. Even though this was already showing signs of itself going through a 
period of significant change, with Europe viewed ‘as a zone of economic and political weakness’, it 
was this which was viewed as being essential in helping demonstrate that Britain was both the hub 
of a significant international network and still remained a significant global actor.  
 
The debate about this strategy that began in the immediate post-war period at Seaford House, the 
home of the modern-day college, has continued ever since and without any sign of conclusion. It 
has followed closely the ever-expanding body of research and thought that has developed over the 
intervening years to supplement the literature that dates back to the earliest days of the 
establishment of the British Commonwealth. Presenting evidence to an ad hoc House of Lords 
committee appointed in May 2013 to examine this subject, the distinguished former diplomat Lord 
Hannay of Chiswick offered the neat summary that ‘Britain’s international influence has fluctuated 
quite widely in the past hundred years as have the relative contributions to it of Britain’s hard and 
soft power’.3 This has become a key theme to understanding the national position, the clear 
distinctions that have grown between an ability to exercise these two forms of power and how this 
allows states to influence global events. It was probably a reasonable conclusion made last year by 
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the writers of the Strategic Defence and Security Review when it was claimed with some 
confidence that Britain had become ‘the world’s leading soft power’.4  
 
Recent events, however, have brought this assertion into question. Added to the swirling pattern of 
unpredictable and expansive global insecurity – ranging across the traditional and more non-
traditional challenges – which has emerged over recent years has been the momentous outcome of 
the UK’s referendum held in June 2016 to determine the future of its membership of the EU and the 
publication of the long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Report) which has provided a 
series of important conclusions about the nation’s role in the 2003 Iraq War. These have brought 
into question the validity of the SDSR’s claims and there are clear parallels to the uncertainty that 
existed seventy years ago.  Once again the college’s students find themselves trying to anticipate 
what this will all mean for Britain and its future. 
 
The re-establishment of the IDC in 1945 was by no means guaranteed despite the proposal having a 
number of key supporters such were the financial constraints facing the country. The college had 
been originally created to support the professional development of senior military officers and civil 
servants and it was argued that it had helped bring these two sides of the civil-military war effort 
together.5 General Sir Alan Brooke, Britain’s senior military officer and himself a graduate of the 
college, was amongst those who praised the ‘inestimable service’ it had played pre-war in helping 
develop ‘inter-service thought and co-operation’; he, in fact, led the drive to re-open it which 
followed Japan’s eventual surrender.6 He was backed by the prime minister, Clement Attlee, who 
was also Minister for Defence, retaining the twin role which had been established by his 
predecessor Winston Churchill. When he gave his formal approval on 20 September 1945 that the 
IDC should be re-opened preparations began at once and in the weeks that followed the extent of 
his enthusiasm was made abundantly clear.7  
 
[NB new paragraph] The process had begun with a report prepared for the chiefs of staff which set 
out how the college had been organised pre-war along with a series of recommendations that might 
be considered for changes.8 On the final uncompleted course which had begun in 1939 there had 
been thirty-six students, six each from the three services plus one territorial officer, six civil 
servants, three attendees from India and two each from Australia, Canada, South Africa and New 
Zealand. Other than removing the territorial officer, which allowed one more regular officer to be 
added, the only other recommendation was that there needed to be a general increase in the 
seniority of the students, and the total course strength ‘should ultimately be doubled’. There was 
also a note that the commandant and his directing staff be appointed as soon as possible so that 
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studies could commence once again in January 1946 although March was tacitly accepted as being 
the earliest realistic date for opening due to the amount of preparations that needed to be done.  
 
Attlee endorsed another of Brooke’s key recommendations, that the next commandant needed to be 
a more senior figure with ‘requisite experience and prestige’ and the committee favoured a 
‘successful Army commander’.9 The officer selected for the position was General William Slim, 
acclaimed today for his leadership of the Fourteenth Army during the victorious campaign it fought 
in Burma, although at the time the role he had played was not widely known amongst the British 
public.10 Having been commissioned in The Royal Warwickshire Regiment, he first saw active 
service in the First World War at Gallipoli and by the conflict’s end had served in France and 
Mesopotamia, been wounded twice and won the Military Cross. In 1919 Slim transferred to the 
Indian Army and much of the inter-war period saw him involved in military education, initially as a 
student at the Staff College, Quetta, then later as a member of the Directing Staff at the Staff 
College, Camberley and, finally, once more as a student, at the IDC. By March 1942 he had been 
appointed as the commander of First Burma Corps, and his own memoirs – which remain a standard 
text for those studying at Staff Colleges around the world - offer the best account of what followed 
through to the conclusion of an extraordinary campaign in which his leadership was decisive.11  
 
There were, however, some tensions surrounding his final months in Burma when an ill-considered 
attempt had been made to remove him from command. Despite having enjoyed his previous time as 
a student at the IDC, Slim apparently determined that he would refuse the summons to return to 
London to now become its commandant.12 Only the insistence of his friend Louis Mountbatten 
persuaded him to change his mind and Attlee was able to announce the appointment during the first 
week of December. 
 
[NB new paragraph] On Christmas Day 1945, the ship carrying Slim back from India docked at 
Liverpool. The prime minister had made prominent reference in his announcement to the prestige 
and ‘great powers or organisation and exposition’ that the new IDC Commandant brought to the 
role.13 By the time he arrived in London a few days later, many of the key arrangements had already 
been confirmed. He was responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence 
but the college continued to be administered by the Admiralty (it had originally been formed as a 
naval establishment) which provided the clerical and other staff, while the cost of running it was 
shared in agreed proportions between the various military Services, the Dominions and India.14 
Initially it had been hoped that the first course would, once again, last for a year but it had by this 
stage been reluctantly accepted that it would have to be shorter beginning in April and ending in 
 4 
 
December. The proposed syllabus was largely completed, a mix of lectures, discussions and 
conferences on the higher executive direction of war, both strategic and administrative in nature and 
character, working towards an essentially un-changed charter of ‘The training of a body of officers 
and civilian officials in the broadest aspects of Imperial strategy’.15 
 
The first course was also limited in terms of numbers, just thirty students as opposed to the 
anticipated figure of seventy who would attend the next one. There were six officers from both the 
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, seven from the Army, three from the Indian Army, two 
Canadians, one each from its army and air force, and the same from Australia, along with a single 
New Zealander. Thirty-nine places were initially made available and the glaring absence was civil 
servants who it was concluded ‘were too busy organising the peace’, even though in their initial 
discussions the chiefs of staff had placed considerable importance on their being some non-military 
representation, and Slim regretted the loss of these six students.16 There were also no South 
Africans, as the country’s leader, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, confirmed early on that he was not able 
to send any military attendees ‘due to depletion of permanent force suitable officers’.17 Until the 
very last minute efforts were made to persuade him to release Major-General Evered Poole, one of 
his senior Army officers still then serving in the Mediterranean, and even a direct intervention from 
Brooke proved unsuccessful although Smuts promised him that this was only a temporary 
absence.18  
 
One major difference in the first course that followed the war’s end, and which reflected the major 
strategic shift that had taken place and the changed nature of the international system, was that three 
American students, one from each service, were now invited to attend. Shortly before his 
retirement, the chief of the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal had made this proposal as 
part of wider plans for post-war exchanges with British and Commonwealth officers at training 
schools and establishments.19 As a result Field Marshal ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, the senior British military 
official in Washington, was contacted by the Chiefs of Staff committee for his views and his quick 
response was to ask for confirmation of the number of places that were being offered along with a 
copy of the original charter. Wilson was not a graduate of the college, and despite having initially 
written that there was no suggestion of pandering ‘to American susceptibilities’, he also took the 
opportunity to suggest that the committee might consider changing its name to the ‘Higher Defence 
College’ or the ‘Commonwealth Defence College’.20 It was confirmed in reply that some thought 
had been given to this but it had been decided that it should remain the Imperial Defence College. 
As a sign of just how important this particular aspect of the reopening was considered, it was, 
 5 
 
however, made clear that this could be reconsidered.21 As it was, Wilson was able to inform his 
colleagues in London that agreement had been reached and the Americans would join the course. 
 
With only a few months to the anticipated start date of 2 April 1946, the key job for the new 
Commandant became identifying and confirming suitable premises for the college. This had to be 
near the Service Ministries and have access to the extensive libraries held in other government 
departments. The initial chiefs of staff report had hoped it might be possible to continue to use the 
previous site, 9 Buckingham Gate opposite Buckingham Palace, but the proposal that the course 
would double in size as quickly as possible meant the former site was impractical in the longer 
term. It was anticipated that a much larger space would be needed, fifteen thousand square feet of 
space to accommodate one hundred people, as well as seminar and lecture rooms and possibly even 
a cinema.22 Montagu House, then housing the Ministry of Food, was identified as requiring little in 
the way of alterations and being suitably dignified and quiet, something which was not thought to 
have been the case with Buckingham Gate.23 An approach to the ministry for its potential use was, 
however, rejected and the only possible alternative, a return to the former buildings, albeit with the 
potential addition of the next door property at 8 Buckingham Gate, was now viewed very firmly as 
being unacceptable.24 
 
Slim therefore set out personally to examine other possible options including an American heiress’ 
mansion in Regent’s Park, which was inspected but rejected as being too remote, and the German 
Embassy in Carlton Terrace which was initially thought to have some potential but was then also 
removed from consideration.25 More appealing was Seaford House, a large property located in 
Belgrave Square which had been leased at the beginning of the century from the Duke of 
Westminster’s estate by Tommy Scott-Ellis, 8th Baron Howard de Walden.26 At the war’s start it 
had been used by Red Cross workers to prepare medical supplies for hospitals before being 
formally requisitioned on 13 June 1940 to become home to the Assistance Board which acted as 
agents for the Ministry of Pensions and dealt with temporary injury allowances granted mainly for 
people evacuated under Government schemes. As the Blitz got underway, in October the square 
was bombed and, although the damage to the property was not great, its temporary occupants were 
evacuated and the building derequisitioned. It remained empty for nearly eighteen months but was 
again pressed into service in March 1943 as reserve office accommodation for the Air Ministry. 
With the war’s end, France was looking for a new site for its embassy and negotiations had already 
begun about using Seaford House. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, intervened to halt these and 
by January 1946 it had been agreed the buildings would instead become the IDC’s new home.27 
There was little funding available to equip the new college and Slim agreed that he would initially 
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ask only for the minimum amount of structural alterations.28 A canteen was, however, deemed vital 
and this would be needed before the end of March along with chairs, tables, plates, crockery and 
cutlery. Additional furniture for lecture rooms and the ante-rooms was also required and the 
Commandant did insist that this should be of a suitable kind, such as was found in Commanders-in-
Chief’s houses.  
 
By this stage, early February 1946, Slim had already found that, despite the promises he had 
received, progress was not being achieved at the pace required and he was still largely operating 
from Buckingham Gate with only two rooms on the ground floor of Seaford House having been 
made available.29 This led him to set 1 March as a deadline for being given full occupancy of the 
new building after which date the commandant warned that it would not be possible for the course 
to start on time.30 The Air Ministry now promised that five more rooms would be available by the 
following week and they would clear out ‘lock, stock and barrel’ over the weekend of 10/11 March. 
Perhaps mindful of Slim’s threat that the course might not be able to begin, this agreement was kept 
allowing the new occupants finally to move in and begin some frantic preparations to receive the 
students who were to arrive just three weeks later.31 Joining Slim were his four ‘Senior Directing 
Staff’: Rear-Admiral Guy Russell, who had been with him on the 1937 course, Air Vice-Marshal 
Sir Hugh Lloyd, who had served in Bomber Command and was due to have led the Heavy Bomber 
Force operating against Japan, Major-General John Whiteley, who had served under General 
Eisenhower in the Mediterranean and on the Joint Planning Staff,32 and Thomas Chegwidden, a 50 
year-old under-secretary in the Board of Trade who had served throughout the war in supply related 
roles and was appointed as a civilian instructor.33 Supporting the senior staff were another group of 
five military officers who were termed as the ‘Junior Directing Staff’. 
 
The commandant gave the opening address on the morning of Tuesday 2 April and began by telling 
the audience that he hoped their time at Seaford House would be both ‘profitable’ and ‘pleasant’.34 
In explaining the college’s purpose, he referred to it as being intended to produce officers capable 
of holding ‘the highest commands or staff appointments in both peace and war’. He pointed to four 
qualities which he thought were required for those attending, namely ability, experience, knowledge 
and leadership, and these would be a focus throughout the course. The students were also told that 
they would learn much more from each other than from the staff or the lecturers and the network 
they now established would serve them well later.  
 
The purpose of dividing the course into specific periods of study, with emphasis being given to 
global affairs and developments in politics, economics and warfare, was to give them ‘something 
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concrete’ to develop their thoughts and prevent them from ‘becoming too academic’. The college 
was thinking about hypothetical situations five or ten years ahead and it was not assumed that these 
would result in accurate forecasts for, as he put it, ‘do not think we propound solutions to future 
situations here, we don’t’. The IDC’s remit was instead to provide opportunities to practice how 
they would tackle high level defence problems. Much of what was discussed was secret and Slim 
asked that it not be discussed outside the college or with anybody who was not on the course. He 
also welcomed the Americans, noting they were the first non-Empire students to attend, but asked 
that no publicity be given to their presence as this had been a stipulation set by the American 
authorities. It was also confirmed that there would be no civilians on the course as none could be 
spared. With this presentation completed the students departed to be issued with a form of 
identification, a general information leaflet, the programme for the first week and a brief version for 
the entire course, standing orders, secrecy instructions, the officers’ mess rules, a list of attendees 
and a copy of the recently confirmed charter of the United Nations.35 They were also informed that 
smoking was not allowed in the building before or during lectures but was permitted during the 
discussion periods that followed. 
 
This initial short course was arranged into two sessions, the first running from April to the 
beginning of August and the second from September to early December.36 It began with a review of 
global political challenges and likely developments, and discussions about the vital interests of the 
British Commonwealth and Empire and the nature of future war. In May it moved on to consider 
Commonwealth Economics with the summer spent reviewing in turn Middle East security, the 
Commonwealth Defence Organisation, the United Nations Organisation and the specific interests of 
the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China. There were a total of seventy-two lectures 
during the first session with an impressive range of distinguished diplomats, politicians and military 
officers giving presentations to the course. Directly following on from Slim’s opening address to 
the college, and just a week before his appointment was due to come to an end, John G Winant, the 
US Ambassador in London, spoke on the ‘United States interests in relation to World Affairs’.37 On 
6 June, two years to the day since the Allied invasion of Europe had begun, Field Marshal Viscount 
Montgomery came to talk on the theme of ‘Command in Western Europe’. The week after, Louis 
Mountbatten and Lord Tedder followed with accounts of their wartime experiences in South-East 
Asia and the Middle East. There was also a lecture on 18 June from the recently created Field 
Marshal Alan Brooke, 1st Baron Alanbrooke, on ‘Command and Organisation in War’ in which he 
was noted as having said that relations between soldiers and politicians were difficult, ‘more 
training was required’ and politicians should be sent to the IDC before the week ended with a 
keynote presentation from the prime minister.38 The seniority of the speakers was entirely in 
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keeping with Slim’s ambition to highlight the college’s significance as a focal point for developing 
ideas and understanding. 
 
As had been the case with the pre-war courses, the key method of learning involved a series of what 
were termed ‘Schemes and Appreciations’ and these were tackled by syndicate groups, six in total 
the composition of which were regularly changed. The rationale for this approach was that it 
encouraged ‘tolerance of the other’s point of view, and gives the students an insight into the 
working of each other’s minds, which may be invaluable later on when many of them may come 
together again to deal with the problems of real-life’.39 The first of these syndicate exercises 
required those involved to act as joint planning committees and prepare papers for submission to the 
chiefs of staff setting out the vital political, economic, social, military and scientific interests of the 
British Commonwealth.40 This led to a more expansive review as, with the title ‘Get Underneath the 
Other Chap’s Hat’, they were next required to examine the interests and objectives of China, 
France, the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war world.41 There was some latitude in 
terms of how these studies developed; another one of those delivered during the first term was titled 
‘Commonwealth Economics’ but it developed into a detailed study of whether or not Britain could 
afford to keep its Armed Forces in their present form. Three main points emerged: the UN was seen 
as being important as, the more it could be relied upon, ‘the less we need to rely on our own 
strength’; the best future plan was for a combination of training cadres, a small regular force and 
conscription; and finally, as it would never be possible to maintain adequate forces adequate for 
complete security, it was concluded that there was a need to switch to ‘small forces of a different 
kind (e.g. Atomic)’.42 
 
After another month of further high profile presentations, in August the course paused for a short 
period of summer leave during which the students also travelled to Germany. There had already 
been visits to a number of military establishments along with the Port of London, and railway and 
industrial centres, but Slim was also keen that there should be the opportunity to undertake overseas 
visits. The proposal was rejected, apparently on the basis of the difficulties involved in finding 
transport at a time when this was in short supply, and the financial implications.43 The commandant 
persisted and eventually it was agreed that a specially provided aircraft would transport the men, 
split into three groups, for ‘invaluable’ seven-day visits which began in Berlin before moving to the 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) Headquarters in Bad Oeynhausen, from where they also 




When the course resumed for its second term, it began with a review of how sanctions were to be 
applied by the United Nations before beginning a study of what was termed ‘the Indian problem’. 
This left October for general work on what ‘a major war’ would entail, before a final phase which 
looked at “the Commonwealth Security Plan”. There were a further fifty-one lectures during this 
session and more very senior speakers. Perhaps the most impressive package began on 9 October 
with Earl Halifax, who had overseen the committee which confirmed the College’s establishment 
back in 1923, and, most recently had been the British Ambassador in Washington. He gave a 
presentation titled ‘Anglo-US Relations’ and the next day was followed by Dwight D Eisenhower 
(soon to be chief of staff to the US Army) who gave another keynote address to the students on the 
same theme. By the time Slim stood on the stage at Seaford House on Friday 13 December to 
deliver his closing address, the first post-war course had listened to 123 lectures and tackled thirteen 
complex study problems.45 One of those who heard this, now unfortunately untraceable, final 
address concluded that his time at the college had provided him with ‘a crucial introduction to the 
mysteries of higher command’, sentiments that seem to have been shared widely amongst those 
who were in the audience.46  
 
One of Slim’s many biographers has described the first course as ‘an extended post-mortem of the 
war, a study of the lessons learned and an examination of how those lessons could be applied to 
future conflicts’.47 It was, of course, more than just that as the re-establishment of the IDC 
presented an important opportunity to affirm Britain’s position and seniority within the radically 
changed international system. The commandant was central to this process and the time he spent at 
Seaford House proved a crucial period in establishing how the college developed a broader 
understanding of the post-war international system. In July 1946 he received confirmation that it 
had been decided to maintain the pre-war policy and his appointment would only be for two years 
and he stepped down the following year passing the role to Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor.48 
Since Slim’s departure, the college he helped revitalise has become viewed globally as a bench-
mark against which the delivery of senior level professional military education is compared.49 It has 
continued to expand and currently around fifty nations each year send Members to attend the annual 
course at what is now the RCDS, the senior college of the UK’s Defence Academy.50 Military 
officers and senior civil servants are joined by representatives from industry and Parliamentarians, 
the latter attending as part of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Trust programme. It has at the same 
time sought to make a significant contribution to how the role of strategy and the strategic level of 
activity is understood within the British military and across Whitehall. The college’s key ethos - the 
need for “joined-up” thinking to address the ever more daunting challenges to stability, security and 
prosperity that face the modern world – is unchanged and the vital legacy that was set in motion by 
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the first post-war Commandant remains intact. In this period of renewed uncertainty its utility and 
value would appear to be just as important as when Bill Slim sat down to tackle his next big job.
 
* Generous support is acknowledged from King’s College London’s Defence Studies Department and the university’s 
Undergraduate Research Fellowship which contributed to research connected with this paper. Sincere thanks are also 
offered to Sir Tom Phillips KCMG and David Steeds who commented upon a draft version. The analysis, opinions and 
conclusions expressed or implied are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Royal College 
of Defence Studies, the UK Defence Academy, the UK Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. 
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